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1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed the revival of theoretical studies into monetary policy and the surprising
comeback of the liquidity traps and deflation in academia. In JaPan, the average inflation rate was-0.5% in
the 1995-2000 period. The study of deflation is no longer atheoretical curiosum; deflation is areal economic
issue.
In this paper, Iconsider deflation in aneoclassical growth model. The cash-in-advance monetary model
of Lucas-Stokey (1983) is introduced into an otherwise standard overlapping generations economy with
productive capital and government debt. The main purpose of this study is to address the following question:
how likely it is to observe deflationary (long-run) equilibrium in aneoclassical growth framework? Ifind
that anecessary condition for adeflationary steady state to exist is that the economy grows at apositive
rate. In other words, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, an economy with anegative growth rate
cannot support deflation in the long run. In addition, asufficient condition for asteady state equilibrium
without government deficits to be deflationary is that the nominal interest rate is below the growth rate of
the economy.
Recent theoretical studies reveal that how monetary and fiscal policies are conducted is of critical impor-
tance for uniqueness, determinacy, and stability of equilibria. Such study of monetary policy in adynamic
general equilibrium framework dates back at least to Sargent and Wallace (1981), who emphasized the im-
portance of monetary and fiscal policy interactions in determining inflation rates. The recent revival of the
theory of monetary policy is led by Woodford (1994, 1995, 2001), for example, who pushed Sargent and
Wallace’s argument further and popularized the fiscal theory of the price level.
Recent theoretical work on monetary policy mainly asks whether aparticular monetary-fiscal policy rule
introduces unintended instability such as sunspot fluctuations. To the best of my knowledge, there is little
theoretical attempt in understanding deflation in the context of dynamic general equilibrium framework. In
the textbook Keynesian framework, on the other hand, deflation or disinflation can easily occur when the
aggregate demand declines or the aggregate supply goes up. Since such textbook explanation is derived from
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astatic, sticky price framework, it is not clear whether deflation that is obtained is along-run phenomenon.
This paper is intended to shed some light on deflationary long-run equilibria in aneoclassical growth model.
It is often documented that the standard neoclassical growth model fails to provide atheoretical frame
work that is consistent with the conventional wisdom that high inflation rates are associated with low nominal
interest rates. In fact, the standard neoclassical growth model implies that an increase in the money growth
rate drives interest rates $\mathrm{u}\mathrm{p}.2$ The textbook Keynesian IS-LM model, on the other hand, is conformed to
the conventional wisdom. This, however, is due to the Keynesian presumption that prices are sticky so that
any change in the nominal interest rate is equivalent to achange in the real rate of the same magnitude.
The theoretical framework Ioffer in this paper is asimple neoclassical growth model with flexible prices in
which higher nominal interest rates reduce capital and inflation.
For this is an attempt in understanding deflation in aneoclassical growth framework in general, the
specific model Iadopt here deliberately eliminates unnecessary complications. Thus, Iextend Diamond’s
(1965) neoclassical growth framework to incorporate money and government bonds. In order to model money
demand in asimple manner, Iadopt the standard cash-in-advance model developed by Lucas and Stokey
(1983). Although the cash-in-advance model of money is not commonly used in an overlapping generations
framework, it provides asimple yet powerful tool to study monetary policy issues within aneoclassical
production economy.
The primary focus of this paper is on deflation as an equilibrium phenomenon. This requires amodel
in which the money growth rate is endogenous. Thus, Iconsider an environment in which the monetary
authority conducts its policy via nominal interest rate pegging. It is shown that if the government has no
budget deficits, then there are in general two steady state equilibria. The steady state with alow capital
stock has alow inflation rate and is deflationary if the nominal interest rate is set below the growth rate of
the economy. It is shown that such asteady state is asaddle. The other steady state is associated with a
high inflation rate, but the real bond holding at that steady state is negative. The steady state is shown to
be asymptotically stable.
Iextend the model by introducing government deficits. Introduction of such deficits changes the prop
erties of the economy in afew respects. First, there are two steady state equilibria, both of which are
dynamically inefficient. Second, the real bond holding at both steady states can be positive if the amount





The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2presents asimple budget arithmetic using the
steady state government budget constraint. Section 3describes the model economy. Section 4characterizes
equilibrium conditions under interest rate pegging. Section 5describes steady state equilibria. Section 6
discusses dynamic properties of the model. Section 7concludes.
2Budget Arithmetic Under Deflation
What are the characteristics of an economy that experiences deflation in the long run? In this section
Iconsider implications of deflation for the government’s budget constraint. The flow government budget
constraint is given as
$G_{t}=T_{t}+B_{t}-I_{t}B_{t-1}+M_{t}-M_{t-1}$ , (1)
where $G$ is the nominal government spending, $T$ is the nominal tax receipt, $B$ is the nominal bonds, $M$ is the
nominal money balance, and I is the gross nominal interest rate. (1) states that government expenditures
are financed by taxes, bonds, and money. Suppose that the economy grows at the gross rate of $n>0$ . Let
$p$ denote the price level. Then one can rewrite (1) as
$g_{t}= \tau_{t}+b_{t}-\frac{R_{t}}{n}b_{t-1}+m_{t}-\frac{1}{\Pi_{t}}\frac{1}{n}m_{t-1}$ ,
where $g$ is the real government spending per capita, $\tau$ is the real tax per capita, $b$ is the real bonds per
capita, $m$ is the real money balance per capita, $R$ is the gross real interest rate, and $\Pi$ is the gross inflation
rate. Suppose that there is asteady state equilibrium in which all per capita real variables are constant over
time. Then the steady state government budget constraint is
$g= \tau+(1-\frac{R}{n})b+(1-\frac{1}{\Pi n})m$ . (2)
Rewrite the government budget constraint, using the Fisher equation, $I=R\Pi$ , as
$g= \tau+(1-\frac{I}{\Pi n})b+(1-\frac{1}{\Pi n})m$ ,
so the gross inflation rate is
$\Pi=\frac{Ib+m}{(b+m+\tau-g)n}$ . (3)
From (3), it is easy to show that, ceteris paribus, $\Pi$ decreases as $n$ increases. In addition, it is easy to
establish that asteady state is deflationary, or equivalently, $\Pi<1$ holds if and only if
$n> \frac{Ib+7n}{b+m+\tau-g}\equiv\phi$ ,
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In practice, governments run positive deficits, so one can safely assume that $g-\tau\geq 0$ . Also, the nominal
interest rate cannot be negative. Thus, $\phi$ $>1$ for all $m$ and $b$. This implies that $n>1$ must hold for a
steady state to be deflationary. This supports the conventional view that the growth of the supply side
causes inflation to go down and may even cause deflation. This implies that for adeflationary long-run
equilibrium to exist, one must have amodel which grows at apositive rate. Throughout, Iconsider a
neoclassical gowth model with apositive exogenous rate of population growth.
Inow let $n>1$ . What are the characteristics of the monetary policy under deflation? Consider once
again (3). It implies that asteady state equilibrium is deflationary if and only if
(g $-\tau)n<(n$ -I) $b+(n$ -1)m.
In order to obtain sharp result, assume for now that $g=\tau$ . Then, it follows that in any long-run equilibrium
with $I>1$ , setting the nominal interest rate at $I<n$ is sufficient for $\Pi$ $<1$ .
To summarize,
Proposition 1 $a$) A necessary condition for deflation is that an economy grows at a positive rate. $b$) At any
steady state equilibrium without government deficits, a sufficient condition for deflation is that the nominal
interest rate is belcnu the gmwh rate of the economy.
An economy that experiences deflation is one in which the nominal interest rate is below the growth rate
of the economy. This is consistent with the historical observation that deflation occurs in an economy that
is considered as being trapped in as0-called liquidity trap (i.e., the economy that hits the lower bound of
the nominal interest rate), such as the US in the 1930’s and Japan in the $1990’ \mathrm{s}$.
Although the structure presented in this section considers only the government budget constraint at a
steady state, the analysis reveals that a $\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}\infty \mathrm{s}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{y}$ condition for adeflationary steady state to exist is that
the economy grows at apositive rate. In other words, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, an economy
with anegative growth rate cannot support deflation in the long-run. Further, setting the nominal interest
rate below the growth rate of the economy is sufficient for deflation in an economy without deficits. In the
following sections, Ipresent asimple dynamic general equilibrium model that supports deflation at asteady




Consider agrowing economy consisting of an infinite sequence of two period lived overlapping generations,
an initial old generation, and an infinitely-lived government. Let $t=1$ , 2, $\ldots$ index time. At each date $t$ ,
anew generation comprised of $N_{t}$ identical members appears where $N_{t}$ evolves according to $N_{t+1}=nN_{t}$ .
Iassume that population growth is the only source of (exogenous) growth. Each agent is endowed with
one unit of labor when young and is retired when old. In addition, the initial old agents are endowed with
$M_{0}>0$ units of fiat currency and $k_{1}>0$ units of capital.
There is asingle final good produced using astandard neoclassical production function $F(K_{t},L_{t})$ where
$K_{t}$ denotes the capital input and $L_{t}$ denotes the labor input at $t$ . Let $k_{t}\equiv K_{l}/L_{t}$ denote the capital-
labor ratio. Then, output per worker at time $t$ may be expressed as $f(k_{t}^{\sim})$ where $f(h)$ $\equiv F(K_{t}/L_{t}, 1)$ is
the intensive production function. Iassume that $f(0)=0$, $f’>0>f’$ , and that Inada conditions hold.
The final good can either be consumed in the period it is produced, or it can be stored to yield capital
the following period. For reasons of analytical tractability, capital is assumed to depreciate lm% between
periods.
3-2 Factor Markets
Factor markets are perfectly competitive. Thus, factors of production receive their marginal product. Let
$r_{t+1}$ denote the gross return on capital, and let $w_{t}$ denote the real wage rate. Young agents supply their
labor endowment inelastically in the labor market. Then, firms’ profit maximization requires
$r_{t+1}$ $=$ $f’(k_{t+1}.)$ , (4)
$w_{t}$ $=$ $f(k_{t}.)-k_{t}f’(k_{\mathrm{t}})\equiv w(k_{t})$ . (5)
Note that $w’(k)=-kf’$ $(\ )>0$ for all $k$ . It will be useful to introduce arestriction on the production
technology. In particular, Iassume throughout that $k.w’(k)/w(k)<1$ holds. Cobb Douglas production
function, for example, satisfies this condition.
3.3 Consumers
Let $c_{1t}(c_{2t})$ denote the consumption of the final good by ayoung (old) agent born at date $t$ . In order
to simplify the analysis as much as possible, Iassume that agents care consumption only when old. This
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immediately follows that $c_{1t}=0$ for all $t$ so aU income $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{U}$ be saved. Following Lucas and Stokey (1983)
and more recently Woodford (1994), Iassume that consumption goods are divided into two types: “cash
goods” and “credit goods.” Cash goods must be purchased by cash, so agents wishing to consume cash
goods need cash in advance. On the other hand, agents do not need cash to purchase credit goods. Let $Cmt$
$(c_{nt})$ denote the amount of cash (credit) goods consumed when old. Then, $c_{2t}=c_{mt}+c_{nt}$ holds. Iassume
that the marginal rate of transformation in production is unity between the two goods so the price of the
two goods is identical and denoted by $P_{t}$ . The cash-in-advance constraint is
$p_{\mathrm{t}+1}c_{mt} \leq\frac{M_{t}}{N_{t}}$ , (6)
where pt denotes the time $t$ price level and $Mt/Nt$ denotes the nominal money balance per young, According
to (6), ayoung agent must set aside cash in advance in order to purchase cash goods when old.
It is assumed that agents may hold money and non-monetary assets. The non-monetary assets, denoted
by $A_{t}$ , are assumed to yield the gross nominal return of $I_{t+1}\geq 1$ in the next period. Iassume that agents
do not have access to any other storage technology. The budget constraint for ayoung agent born at date
$t$ is therefore
$\frac{M_{l}}{N_{t}}+\frac{A_{l}}{N_{t}}\leq p_{t}w_{t}$ , (7)
where $A_{t}/N_{t}$ is the non-monetary asset holding per capita. (7) states that ayoung agent of generation $t$
receives nominal wage income and allocates all income to monetary and non-monetary assets (because no
one consumes when young). Throughout, Iconsider only symmetric equilbria in which all agents of the
same generation have the same amount of assets. Since the nominal interest rate on money is zero, the
budget constraint when old is
$p_{\ell+1}c_{2t} \leq\frac{M_{t}}{N_{t}}+I_{t+1}\frac{A_{t}}{N_{t}}$ . (8)
Divide both sides of (7) and (8) by $pt$ and $p_{t+1}$ . respectively, to obtain
$m_{t}+a_{t}\leq w_{t}$ (9)
and
$c_{2t} \leq\frac{p_{t}}{p_{t+1}}m_{t}+R_{t+1}a_{t}$ , (10)
where $m_{t}\equiv M_{t}/N_{t}p_{t}$ , $a_{t}\equiv A_{t}/N_{t}p_{t}$ , and the gross real interest rate satisfies the Fisher equation,
$I_{t+1}\equiv R_{t+1^{\frac{p_{C\dagger 1}}{p\iota}}}$. (11)
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Individual rationality implies that (9) and (10) hold at equality. Eliminate $a_{t}$ from (9) and (10) to obtain
the intertemporal budget constraint,
$\frac{c_{2t}}{R_{t+1}}+\frac{I_{t+1}-1}{I_{t+1}}m_{t}=w_{t}$ . (12)
The cash-in-advance constraint binds if and only if money is dominated by non-monetary assets in rates
of return, which is equivalent to $I_{t+1}\geq 1$ . In other words, the cash-in-advance constraint binds as long as
the nominal interest rate is non-negative, which is plausible. Under biding cash-in-advance constraint, (6)
holds at equality. Then, (6) and (10) imply that
$c_{mt}$ $=$ $\frac{p_{t}}{p_{t+1}}m_{t}$ , (13)
$c_{nt}$ $=$ $R_{t+1}a_{t}$ (14)
must hold in equilibrium.
Following Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1991), Ispecify the utility function $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{s}^{3}$




where $0<\sigma<1$ and $0<\rho<1$ . Each young agent chooses $Cmt$ and $Cnt$ to maximize (15) subject to (9),
(13), and (14). This problem is equivalent to maximizing
$\ln\{[(1-0)$ $( \frac{p_{C}}{p_{t+1}}m_{t})^{1-\rho}+\sigma(R_{t+1}a_{t})^{1-\rho}]\overline{1}-\rho \mathrm{L}\}$
with respect to $m_{t}$ and $a_{t}$ subject to (9). The first order necessary condition for the maximization problem




It is important to check the properties of the money demand function just derived.
Lemma 27(I) satisfies (a) $\gamma’(I)<0$ for $0<\rho<1$ , (b) $\lim_{Iarrow\infty}\gamma(I)=0$ for $0<\rho<1$ , (c) $0<\gamma(I)<1$ ,
and (d)
$\frac{I\gamma’(I)}{\gamma(I)}=-\frac{1-\rho}{\rho}[1-\gamma(I)]’$ .
$3\mathrm{A}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ to Chari, Christiano, and Kchoc (1991), $\sigma=0.57$ , $\rho=0.17$ for the $\mathrm{U}.\mathrm{S}$ . economy. Note, however, that the
parameter values are for their model economy in which there is an infinitely lived agent, rather than aseries of overlapPin
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Proof. See Kudoh (2001). $\blacksquare$
Lemma 2(a) states the condition under which the real money demand is decreasing in the nominal
interest rate. As the nominal interest rate increases, the household substitutes away from money, which
reduces money demand. An increase in the nominal rates, at the same time, raises earning from bond
holding, which raises money demand through income effect. The former dominates the latter if $0<\rho<1$ ,
which Iassume to hold throughout. In addition, Iassume that $(1-\rho)I<1$ holds, which is plausible and
easily satisfied.
It is important to compare competing models of money demand in adynamic general equilibrium envi-
ronment. Schreft and Smith $(1997, 2000)$ develop an environment in which spatial separation and limited
communication give rise to the role of banking sector in providing $1\mathrm{i}\mathrm{q}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{y}^{4}$. As is clear, the money demand
function obtained in this paper is virtually identical to the one obtained in Schreft and Smith $(1997, 2000)$ .
That is, the cash in advance model of Lucas Stokey (1983) and the random relocations model of Schreft-
Smith (1997, 1998, 2000) are qualitatively the same. An advantage of the present approach is its simple
model environment.
3.4 Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules
Recent theoretical studies of monetary policy reveal that how fiscal and monetary policies are conducted
is of crucial importance for determinacy, multiplicity, and stability of $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{q}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{h}.\mathrm{b}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{a}^{5}$. In this paper, Iconsider
monetary and fiscal policy rules that are simple yet plausible. In particular, Iassume that the fiscal authority
sets the sequence of the real primary deficits per capita, and that the monetary authority conducts its policy
through targeting the nominal interest rate.
To simplify matters, Ilet $T_{t}=0$ for all $t$ . Then, from (5) the government’s flow budget constraint
becomes
$G_{t}+I_{t}B_{t-1}=B_{t}+M_{t}-M_{l-1}$ (19)
for $t\geq 2$ and $G_{1}+M_{\mathrm{O}}=kI_{1}+B_{1}$ for $t=1$ , where the initial stock of bonds is assumed to be zero. I
assume that the government simply consumes $G_{t}$ and that it docs not affect utility of any generation or the
production process at any date. In order to simplify the analysis, Ifurther assume that $G_{\iota}/\mathrm{A}_{l}’p_{l}=g\geq 0$
$\overline{\triangleleft \mathrm{W}\mathrm{a}11\mathrm{a}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{e}(1984)\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{B}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}1’\backslash \mathrm{u}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{h}}$
$(2001)$ arc examples of the model in which money is held by the banking
sector just to meet the legal reserve requirement.
$The study of monetary-fiscal policy interactions in adynamic general equilibrium setup dates back at least to Sargent and
Wallace (1981), who first linked monetary and fiscal policies by asingle government’s budget constraint. Examples of recent
theoretical work on monetary Policy include Lccpcr (1991), Woodford (1994. 1995), and Schmitt-Grohc and Uribc (2001).
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for all $t$ . That is, the real government spending per young is assumed to be constant over time. Then, it is
easy to rewrite (19) as
$g+ \frac{R_{t}}{n}b_{t-1}=m_{t}-\frac{p_{t-1}}{p_{t}}\frac{1}{n}m_{t-1}+b_{\iota}$ , (20)
where $b_{t}\equiv B_{t}/N_{tPt}$ . The absence of arbitrage opportunity in the capital market requires that capital and
bonds yield the same rate of return. That is, $r_{\ell+1}=R_{t+1}$ holds. Therefore, Ilet $R_{t+1}$ denote the gross rate
of return on capital, bonds and non-monetary asset (at) interchangeably.
The primary interest of this paper is deflation as an equilibrium phenomenon. For this reason, the money
growth rate and the inflation rate must be endogenous in the model. In order to describe determination of
the inflation rate in asimple manner, Iassume that the monetary authority conducts its policy via nominal
interest rate pegging. That is, Iassume that $I_{t}=I>1$ for all dates.
4Equilibrium
This section characterizes equilibrium conditions of the model.
Definition 3A monetary equilibrium is a set of seqegences for allocations $\{m_{t}\}$ , $\{a_{t}\}$ , $\{k_{t}\}$ , $\{b_{t}\}$ , prices
$\{r_{t}\}$ , $\{w_{t}\}$ , $\{\mathrm{p}\mathrm{t}\}$ , and the initial conditions $M_{0}>0$ , $k_{1}>0$ , $B_{0}=0$ such that (a) factor markets clear,
$i.e.$ , (4) and (5) hold, (b) asset market clears: $IC_{t+1}+N_{t}b_{t}=N\mathrm{t}a\mathrm{t}$ , (c) the allocations solve agents’ utility
maximization problem, (d) the cash-in-advance constraint (6) binds, or equivalently, $I_{t}>1$ holds, (e) the
government’s budget constraints $g+\mathrm{A}I_{0}=M_{1}+B_{1}$ for $t=1$ and (19) for $t\geq 2$ hold, and (f) $I_{\iota}=I$ and
$g_{t}=g$ for all $t$ .
The money market equilibrium requires that
$\frac{M_{t}}{p_{t}}=\gamma(I)w(k_{t})$ . (21)
The asset market equilibrium requires $k_{t+1}+b_{t}=a_{t}=w(\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t})-m_{t}$ , which can be rewritten as
$k_{t+1}.+b_{t}=[1-\gamma(I)]w(k_{t}.)$ . (22)
The Fisher equation implies that the gross inflation rate is determined by
$\frac{p_{t+1}}{p_{t}}=\frac{I}{f’(k_{t+1})}$ . (23)
Substitute (23) and (21) into (20) to obtain
$b_{t}=g+ \frac{f’(k_{t})}{n}b_{\ell-1}-\gamma(I)w(k_{t})+\frac{f’(k_{t})}{nI}.\gamma(I)w(k_{t-1}.)$ . (24)




This section considers steady state equilibria in which the government has no primary deficits, that is, g $=0$.
From (22) and (24), steady state equilibria must satisfy
$b=[1-\gamma(I)]w(k)-k\equiv\Gamma(k)$ (25)
and
$b=- \frac{1-\Delta^{k}4\mathfrak{n}I}{1-\angle 1^{k}4,n},,\gamma(I)w(k)\equiv H(k)$ . (26)
It is important to establish the shape of the function $H$, which is spelt out below.
Lemma 4Let $k_{g}$. solve $f’(k)=n$ and let kb solve $f’(k)=nl$. Then, the function H satisfies (a) H $(0)=$
H $(k_{b})=0$ , (b) H $(k)>0\dot{\iota}f$ and only if $k_{b}<k<k_{\mathit{9}}$ . (c) $\lim_{karrow k_{l}}.H’(k)=\infty$ .
Proof. Omitted. $\blacksquare$
Given the shape of $H$, it is easy to show that steady state equih.bria characterized by (25) and (26), are
shown in figure 1. Lemma 4, combined with figure 1, implies that there are in general two non-trivial steady
state equilibria. One is located in the region $k_{b}.<k<k_{g}$.and $b>0$ holds at that steady state. The other
one is found in the region $k_{\mathit{9}}<k$ and $b$ is negative at that steady state.
Note that any steady state solves
$k=[1 -\gamma(I)]w(k)-H$ (&)\equiv \Omega (k). (27)
For future reference, it is important to know some properties of the function $\Omega$.
Lemma 5Define $h(I)\equiv 1-\gamma(I)+\gamma(I)/I>0$ . $Thm$, the function $\Omega$ satisfies (a)
$\Omega(k)=[1-h(I)\frac{f’(k)}{n}]\frac{w(k)}{1-\angle L^{k}\mathit{1},n},$. , ,
and (b) $\Omega’(k)<1$ holds at any steady state.
Proof. Sec Kudoh (2001). vi
Lemma 6Let $k_{I}$ solve $f’(k)=I$ . Then, any steady state with $k<k_{I}$ satisfies $\Pi<1$ .
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Proof. From the Fisher equation, it is easy to show that $\Pi=I/f’(k)$ . Thus, $\Pi<1$ holds if and only if
$f’(k)>I$ . ss
The expression for the steady state inflation rate is obtained from (20) as
$\Pi=\Pi(k)\equiv,\frac{\gamma(I)w(k)/n}{(1-\angle[perp] k\lrcorner)nb+\gamma(I)w(k)}$
.
Proposition 7A necessary condition for $\Pi<1$ at a steady state etyith $b>0$ is $n>1$ .
Proof. It is easy to show that
$\Pi<1\Leftrightarrow n>\frac{\gamma(I)w(k)+f’(k)b}{b+\gamma(I)w(k)}\equiv$ $($ &, $b)$ .
$\phi$ (20) $>1$ since $f’(k)>1$ at asteady state with $b>0$ . ss
Proposition 8If $I<n$ holds at a steady state equilibrium with $g=0$ and $b>0$ , then such a steady state
is unique and is deflationary.
It is easy to see that in the model with $g=0$ and $I<n$ , any non-trivial steady state is considered as
being in deflation. In other words, if the monetary authority sets the net nominal interest rate close to zero,
then the economy is necessarily deflationary.
Example 9Suppose that the production function is $3k^{0.33}$ , and let $\sigma=0.6$ , $\rho=0.2$ , $n=1.03$, $g=0$,
$I=1.\mathrm{O}1$ . Then, there are two non-trivial steady states at $k_{l}=0.94$ , $k_{h}=2.85$ . The associated inflation
rates and real bond holdings are, respectively, $\Pi_{\{}=0.98$ , $\Pi_{h}=2.05$ , $b\iota$ $=0.80$ , $b_{h}=-0.32$ .
The above example computes steady state equilibria when $I<n$ . It demonstrates that there are indeed
two steady state equilibria and that the low-A; steady state is deflationary.
5.2 Comparative Statics
It is now possible to study the effects of achange in I on capital accumulation and inflation.
Lemma 10 $h’(I)<0$ holds.
Proof. See Kudoh (2001). In
Proposition 11
$\frac{dk}{dI}.|_{k=k_{\mathfrak{l}}}.<0$ , and $\frac{dk}{dI}|_{k=k_{h}}.>0$
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Proof. Totally differentiate (27) to obtain
$\frac{dk}{dI}$
.
$=, \frac{-h’(I)\angle_{\mathfrak{n}}k\coprod w(k)}{(1-\angle[perp] k4)n(1-\Omega’(k))}$ .
From Lemma 5, $\alpha$ $(k)-1<0$ holds at any steady state. Further, From lemma 10, $h’(I)$ $<0$ holds. It is
therefore easy to establish that $dk/dl<0$ if and only if $f’(k.)>n$ . The rest of the proof is immediate. $\blacksquare$
Proposition 11 asserts that an increase in the nominal interest rate reduces the capital labor ratio if and
only if the economy is dynamically efficient at the steady state. Since $k$ and $\Pi$ are positively related, an
increase in the nominal interest rate reduces the inflation rate at adynamically efficient steady state. Since
any steady state equilibrium with $b>0$ is dynamically efficient in the model without government deficits, it
is possible to conclude that atight money policy through interest rate targeting reduces capital stock and
inflation in the long run. An increase in I reduces the real money balance, which, ceteris paribus, raises
capital stock. At the same time, an increase in I raises the demand for bonds because the return on bonds
goes up. At the low-fc steady state, the latter effect dominates the former so capital investment is reduced
and so is inflation.
The result obtained here is consistent with the conventional wisdom that high nominal interest rates
reduce inflation. In fact, the textbook IS-LM model predicts that an increase in the nominal interest rate
raises the cost of capital and reduces investment, which has anegative impact on the aggregate income and
the inflation rate. Such predictions are based upon the Keynesian presumption that the price level is sticky.
It is easy to see that changes in the nominal rates cause $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\triangleright \mathrm{t}\infty$-one changes in the real rates under sticky
prices. It is well-known, however, that getting such predictions in aneoclassical, flexible price framework is
not atrivial matter. As Christiano and Eichcnbaum (1992) note, the standard dynamic general equilibrium
model predicts in general that the growth rate of money is positively related with the nominal interest rate.
Proposition 12 $dk/dn<0$ holds at any steady state.
Proof. See Kudoh (2001). $\blacksquare$
Proposition 12 asserts that an increase in the growth rate of the economy reduces the steady state
capital-labor ratio and the inflation rate. This result supports the conventional wisdom that the capacity
growth causes inflation to go down
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6Dynamics
This section describes dynamic properties of the model. From (22), $k_{t}>k_{t-1}\Leftrightarrow$
$b_{t-1}<[1-\gamma(/)]w(\mathrm{k})-k_{t}$ . (28)
From (22) and (24), it is easy to establish that $b_{\mathrm{C}}>b_{t-1}\Leftrightarrow$
$\frac{f’(k_{t})}{n}b_{t-1}-\gamma(I)w(k_{t})+\frac{f’(k_{t})}{n}\frac{\gamma(I)}{I}\frac{k_{t}+b_{t-1}}{1-\gamma(I)}>b_{t-1}$,
which can be rewritten as
$[h(I) \frac{f’(k_{t})}{n}-[1-\gamma(I)]]b_{t-1}>[1-\gamma(I)]\gamma(I)w(k_{t})-\frac{\gamma(I)hf’(k_{t})}{nI}$ (29)
Suppose
$\frac{f’(k_{t})}{n}>\frac{1-\gamma(I)}{h(I)}\equiv\Phi$ $(I)$ , (30)
where $0<\Phi$ $(I)<1$ holds for any $I>0$ . Then $b_{t}>b_{t-1}\Leftrightarrow$
$b_{t-1}$ (31)
Figure 2shows typical configuration of the phase diagram of the system, where Ilet $k_{\Phi}$ solve $f’(k)=n\Phi$ $(I)$ .
According to figure 2, the low-A; steady state is asaddle, while the high-/: steady state is asymptotically
stable.
7Conclusion
This paper has considered equilibria with deflation in aneoclassical growth model. The cash-in-advance
monetary model of Lucas Stokey (1983) is introduced into astandard overlapping generations economy with
productive capital and government debt. Monetary policy is conducted via interest rate targeting so the
inflation rate is endogenous. In contract to the standard monetary growth model with an infinitely lived
agent, the model developed in this paper predicts that higher nominal interest rates reduce inflation in the
long-run. This proves that the model developed in this paper is areasonable platform for studying monetary
and fiscal policy issues.
Simple budget arithmetic reveals that the necessary condition for along-run equilibrium with deflation
to arise is that the economy grows at apositive rate. Further, if the nominal interest rate is set below the
growth rate of the economy, then the economy without deficits is deflationary
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Figure 1. Steady state equlibria without deficits.
Figure 2. Dynamical equilibria without deficits.
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